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There is a general consensus throughout the United States
that there exists a crisis in the nation's health care de-
livery system. In general, the shortage of health manpower,
and specifically of physicians, is a major element of the
problem. Despite recommendations from various quarters to
shorten the training period, increase physician productiv-
ity, and/or construct new buildings, medical schools appear
not to have been particularly responsive to the increased
demand for physicians.
Focusing on the supply of physicians per se, with a
goal of constructing a functional equation, a review of the
literature then examines the historical production of physi-
cians since the publication of the famous Flexner Report of
1910. Since the shortage of engineers and scientists in the
1950' s bears some resemblance to the physician shortage,
work of that period is inspected. Various meanings of short-
age are discussed to make this comparison. American Medical
Association policies are. examined to determine their effect
on this supply function. With this groundwork, one is then
able to formulate a set of structural equations which ex-
plain what influences the supply of physicians in any partic-
ular year. These structural equations serve as a guideline
for the construction of behavioral equations which describe
physician supply in detail. Finally the problem of physi-
cian supply in the Navy is examined with regard to the above
factors and parameters.

II. SURVEY OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL
In canvassing the literature on the supply of physicians,
one is immediately struck with the paucity of research in
this area. Although the United States has been concerned
with the shortage of physicians since the 1930' s, only re-
cently has concentration centered on the supply side of the
question.
Traditionally economists investigating the doctor short-
age have concentrated on analyzing the discrepancies between
demand and supply — a shortage. In 1933 Lee and Jones uti-
lized a "needs approach. " Based on expert opinion, they es-
timated the total number of physician hours it would require
to prevent, diagnose and treat each major disease and injury
for a population of a given age/sex composition. By assuming
the average physician would work a forty-hour week, fifty
weeks a year, they concluded that the nation would require
135 physicians per 100,000 persons to achieve the stated
goal. Today the current physician population ratio is in ex-
cess of 150 per 100,000, medical science has certainly prog-
ressed since the 1930' s, and there are more paramedical
personnel per capita now than in the 1930's [1].
In The Doctor Shortage
,
Rashi Fein devotes one chapter to
the "Supply of Physicians". However he is "interested not
directly in physicians, but in the supply of services, and
the contributions these services make to health and thus in
the level of health itself," again sidestepping the actual
8

questions centered on the supply side. He attempted to get
around the proxy of physician-patient ratio mentioned earli-
er. Although the proxy is inadequate, because it does not
measure physicians' services, does not include an adjustment
for quality, and ignores changes in productivity and advances
in medicine, this proxy was used again because of the com-
plexities involved in obtaining or constructing any other
measure. On the supply side, the number of physicians has
been the only available measure and consequently served as a
useful first approximation to the quantity of physician serv-
ices available. After examining the trends of numbers of
physicians, the physician-patient ratio (see Table I) and
numbers of schools and graduates (see Table II), Fein men-
tioned the controversy concerning increasing the number of
student admissions [2]. There were those who felt admissions
to medical schools could be increased without lowering the
quality of the student admitted or lowering the quality of
education offered. He mentioned quality of the student (as
measured by undergraduate grades) as related to quality of
the medical school education and the undergraduate quality
of his subsequent performance as a physician. In other words,
does a medical student's grades have any relation to perform-
ance in medical school or later as a physician? Secondly,
he asked if the nation's health would be better served with
more physicians even of somewhat lower quality, on the aver-
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Source: Data through 1957 from U.S. Public Health Service,
Health Manpower Source Book
,
Sec. 9, Physicians, Dentists
and Professional Nurses (1959), p. 9. Data for 1959 and
1962 from Milton Friedman and Simon Kuznets, Income from
Independent Professional Practice
,
Sec. 14, Medical Spe-
ialists (1962), p. 3.
Excludes June graduates of the year concerned.
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years from Journal of the American Medical Association ,
Vol. 198, No. 8 (Nov. 21, 1966), p. 868.
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Since Fein's chapter was concerned with the "supply of
physicians," he did not deal directly with these questions,
nor did he do more than point out the existing disparities
in physician distribution due to geography, specialty, age,
or type of practice. Instead he discussed supply projections,
centering concern on two questions: (1) Can the increase be
accomplished without a relaxation of quality standards? and,
(2) What growth in the total number of physicians is implied
by the growth in the number of graduates? With over 13,000
graduates expected in 1975, and an 18 percent increase in
the 1965-75 decade, he used figures from the Bureau of the
Census to provide an encouraging answer to the first question.
The number of persons age 22 will grow by 29 percent during
the same period and the Office of Education estimated bache-
lor degrees granted will expand by 52 percent. Consequently
the medical schools will have a significantly larger pool
from which to draw their students, presumably of comparable
quality. In answering the second question, he concluded
that the physician population ratio would remain relatively
steady during the period [3].
By centering on supply projections, he neglected the as-
pects which influence physician supply. The discussion of
physician-patient ratio focused on the number of physicians
while neglecting the possible increase in productivity. It




An early and still highly influential study of physician
shortage was included in Milton Friedman and Simon Kuznets 1
study of professional practice. They investigated five in-
dependent professions (medicine, dentistry, law, certified
public accounting, and consulting engineering) using data
from 1929-36. Probably their most important conclusion was
that there existed a shortage (i.e. price of an item exceed-
ing its cost, including a normal profit) for each profession;
that is, the additional returns outweighed the additional
costs of acquiring a professional education for all the pro-
fessions surveyed. They cite the cause as follows:
"At present, the limitations on the number of
persons in a position to enter the professions must
be considered the basic reasons for the difference
between extra returns and extra costs; more basic
even than the difference in ability needed. A siz-
able number, perhaps a majority, of all young men
are unable to enter the professions because they
cannot make the necessary capital investment or for
other reasons. If these hindrances were removed,
the reservoir of persons unable to enter the pro-
fessions could surely furnish many persons as able
as those who now embark on professional careers." [4]
During the period concerned, physicians on the average,
earned 32 percent more per year than did dentists, although
ordinary economic forces could account for no more than half
this difference, which Friedman and Kuznets attributed to
"the greater difficulty of entry into medicine." This dif-
ficulty they attributed to an effect of public policies de-
signed to raise the quality of medical education or as a
deliberate policy of limiting the number of entrants in order
to keep down the total number of physicians, that is to
13

prevent "overcrowding" of the profession, such as accrediting
medical schools and licensure laws [5].
Kessel has done extensive work analyzing the economic
implications of the control exercised by the AMA over the
education, licensure and pattern of practice of American
physicians (addressed later). M. F. Bognanno and J. R. Jef-
fers have extended his work and view the "persistence of
(doctor) shortages over the long run as a market imperfection
reflecting serious misallocation of resources involving sig-
nificant unwarranted social costs. Internal rates of return
of medical education and levels of physician income that are
substantially above those earned in more competitive markets
are interpreted as evidence of the existence of market im-
perfections." Organized medicine maintains that higher qual-
ity is achieved by limiting the number of applicants admitted
to medical school. Bognanno and Jeffers however determined
the actual social cost to consumers of the restrictions in
the physician market, asking whether the "quality" or value
of additional benefits offset that cost. To do this they
let 3 represent the rate of growth in per capita outlays on
physician services and Y represent the observed rate of
growth of physician income over time. Then if Y. represents
the average predicted physician income at time t, Y repre-
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Further if a constant ratio supply policy has been followed
in the past (~& - y) = 0. The null hypothesis that (~$ - y)=0
is rejected at the .01 level, indicating that the growth in
average physician income is consistent with the implications
of the constant ratio supply hypothesis. Their conclusion
is that quality does not offset additional cost and the sup-
ply restrictions should be removed, unless organized medicine
can clearly show that the "quality" of medicine would then
decline [6]
.
"National health care" policy in itself is a vague con-
struct. Since there did not then exist an operational defi-
nition of "adequate health care," Carl M. Stevens in his
work took a basic health care plan and considered its provi-
sions as a guaranteed "floor" or minimum. Taking the Kaiser
Health Plan of Portland Oregon of 1967 as a model, he asked:
What number of physicians would be "required" if the popula-
tion as whole utilized physician services at the same rate
as do these members? This "required" number was then com-
pared with the number of physicians actually available. He
addressed three areas of concern: (1) Kaiser utilization
rates and Kaiser physician output, (2) Kaiser utilization
rates and U.S. physician output, and (3) U.S. utilization
rates and U.S. physician output. Having restricted his con-
sideration to the Portland Metropolitan area, he then pro-
jected his figures to Oregon as a state and the U.S. as a
nation. He found that the 1174 non-Federal physicians in
the Portland area exceeded the "required" number for Kaiser
15

utilization rates and Kaiser physician output (655); for
Kaiser utilization rates and U.S. physician output (800) and
even for U.S. utilization rates and Kaiser physician output
(1000). However these excesses did not necessarily indicate
that a shortage did not exist, since utilization rates and
physician output rates are not in themselves measures of de-
mand and supply. That is to say Kaiser physicians may limit
the amount of health care supplied, despite a demand for a
greater quantity. Nor was the question of actually organiz-
ing and implementing any of the locations into such a health
care system addressed. A short run solution (not considering
increasing the supply of physicians) suggested two alterna-
tives: (1) Increase the supply of physician services without
increasing the number of physicians — increase physician
productivity, (2) Decrease the demand for physician services.
These he characterized as only possibly feasible, and rather
unlikely. Allowing the disequilibrium to run its course
with concomitant rises in costs and prices has become increas-
ingly unacceptable to the consumers of medical services given
the present imperfections in the market structure. His final
alternative therefore was a form of non-price rationing or
price control, either by relying on some form of voluntary
restraint or in national health insurance legislation, or a
combination of both [7],
Recently Charles Stewart and Corezon Siddayao, have at-
tempted to focus concern not on the shortage of physicians,
but on physician distribution by area and specialty. They
16

recognized the shortage only as a short term problem already
somewhat relieved by an increase in medical schools and their
enrollment in the 1950' s; as well as the continuing infusion
Nof foreign trained physicians. Whether the target was to
eliminate the assumed shortage of 50,000 of 1973, attain the
ratio of the highest census division, or the ratio of the
highest state, they argued that it would eventually have oc-
curred even without the effects of the 1964 legislation, pos-
sibly even by the late 1970' s. With the surplus of qualified
applicants to medical school, the high levels of physicians'
incomes and the recent rapid increase thereof, they main-
tained that subsidies to medical students have no justifica-
tion. Instead they recommended a reorganization of the
medical care system by economizing on the scarce resource —
physicians. Their productivity could be increased by dele-
gating more tasks to paramedical personnel and closing the
vertical gap in the medical hierarchy, i.e. providing oppor-
tunities for paramedical personnel to advance through exper-
ience, training, and certification to the status of physician
Another alternative suggested was the revision of medical
education to shorten the program through a reduction of the
four years of college before medical school and curtailing
the period of medical school training. Although they sug-
gested these ways of increasing the supply of physicians,
they seriously questioned the need to increase the supply,
noting however, that since the supply of medical services is
determined by consumer demand under conditions of near-zero
17

pricing as a result of third party payments, the shortage
may never be eliminated.
Significantly, they also discussed at length the influx
of foreign medical graduates (FMGs) to the physician supply.
That they are an important input was evidenced by recent
news items as well as the fact that 23 percent of the licences
issued in 1969 alone were to physicians originally coming
from foreign schools. In 1973, it had risen to nearly half.
During the decade from 1959-69 the proportion of those phy-
sicians on record with the AMA rose from 8.6 to 18.4 percent.
It appeared that FMGs accounted for 46 percent of the increase
in practicing physicians during that time. In 1951 FMGs
filled 2000 positions or about 10 percent of all hospital
internships and residencies. By 1959 the proportion rose to
23 percent and in 1969 the number was at 14,500 and the per-
centage at 32. As a matter of fact, in view of the above,
the authors expressed surprise that legislation did not focus
on this source of supply, which would surely dwindle with
the elimination of a shortage rather than be faced with try-
ing to mothball medical schools [8].
Frequently, the presence of many foreign physicians in
this country has been cited as proof in itself of the short-
age of medical school output. Klarman holds that immigrants
were attracted to the U.S. as a better place to work and
live and cited the reason for more FMGs in hospital staffs
as a difference in requirements for house staff training and




James Jonish investigated the entrance of FMGs during
the period 1963-68. He held that the lag in supply adjust-
ments in the U.S. (increases in U.S. relative physician in-
comes and continued vacancies in residencies and internships)
was what attracted foreign medical manpower. With the intro-
duction of the U.S. Immigration Act of 1965, immigration of
FMGs in 1967 and 1968 was more than 50 percent above the 1965
levels. In absolute numbers, the bulk of those physicians
came from less developed countries [10].
It is Michael Lynch' s conclusion, after reviewing the
literature, that the physician shortage has become worse
since the 1950 's due to an increased demand or willingness
to pay on the part of the public. But as proof that the "eco-
nomists' mirror is a bit foggy," he says there is no consensus
on whether an increase in the number of physicians would
lead either to lower fees or to a better geographic and
social distribution of physicians [11].
19

III. PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGINEER SHORTAGE APPLIED
TO THE PHYSICIAN SHORTAGE
In the 1950' s one heard frequent and loud complaints of a
shortage of engineers and scientists, which might have been
taken as an indication of a failure of the pricing mechanism.
There were then also vague proposals for interference with
market determination of numbers and allocation. But the
shortage was exactly what would be predicted by classical
theory in the face of rising demand. As a matter of fact, as
proof that the market is working, until recently, one heard
no complaints of engineer shortage. Despite the temporary
resolution there are indications another engineer shortage is
possible in the near future.
In the 1970' s though one hears echoes of a similar short-
age — that of physicians. What are the similarities between
this shortage and that of engineers during the 1950' s? Much
work was done then examining that shortage, and one might
suspect that some similarities would exist.
Equality of supply- and demand is a central tenet of ordi-
nary economic theory, but only as an end result of a process,
not as a state holding at every instant of time. Inequal-
ities between supply and demand are usually regarded as an
integral part of the process by which the price on a market
reaches its equilibrium position. Price is assumed to rise
when demand exceeds supply and to fall in the contrary case.
In the sense of an excess of demand over supply, a shortage
20

is the normal accompaniment of a price rise. If stability
of the market is assumed, then the shortage observed is tran-
sitory and disappears as equilibrium is reached. However if
the demand curve steadily shifts upward, the shortage will
persist and the price will continue to rise.
In their study, An Economic Analysis of the Market for
Scientists and Engineers [12], economists Alchian, Arrow, and
Capron defined several meanings of "shortage". If there are
chronic vacancies in the job market, a situation that per-
sists indefinitely in which more engineers are demanded at
going salaries than are supplied, a shortage exists. Second,
there may be such vacancies only temporarily because salary
adjustments lag behind a rising market demand, a situation
with policy implications markedly different from the first.
Third, the word shortage is sometimes applied to any situa-
tion where prices or wages rise, with the result that some
potential buyers are priced out of the market, although no
greater quantity of the commodity or service in question is
demanded at the new price or wage than is supplied. Fourth,
a very different meaning of shortage is that market demand
is less than it "ought" to be. This usage can reflect either
a misunderstanding of the workings of a market economy, an
appreciation of the deficiencies of the market mechanism, or
an over-all rejection of the test of the market.
In explanation of the first two cases, we look at Mar-
shall's well-known analysis. His formulation distinguished
two equilibria, short-run and long-run. On the usual price-


















one expects the existence of a shortage to raise the price
gradually to the equilibrium value P. During the process the
shortage decreases to zero. The shortage can persist only
if the price is held at some value such as P
x
by an outside
force, such as price control. In that case we have a short-
age due to a fundamental imperfection of the market.
On the other hand, assume a market which is initially in
equilibrium, e.g. the market for engineers and scientists.
We suppose further that the price of a commodity that uses
engineers in its production has increased. If each firm pro-
ducing this commodity was in equilibrium before the increase
in the commodity price, if it had as many engineers as it
wished to hire at a given salary level, then the number of
engineers that it would pay the firm to hire at the previous
salary has increased, and therefore the market demand has
risen. In Figure 2, Bi represents the original demand curve,
while D2 represents the new demand, rising from some change
in external conditions. It is well to note that this demand
is, in effect, a derived demand, that is the demand is not
for engineers per se, but for the services they provide.
After the demand curve has shifted to D2 , the price that
would bring supply and demand into equilibrium is P2 . But
movement to this price or salary level typically will take
time. At the moment of the shift the market is experiencing
a shortage, which in many respects is comparable to what it
would face under price control. This is called then the
" dynamic shortage " during the shift.
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For the third definition of shortage one looks at the
important study of the engineer-scientist market by Blank
and Stigler [13]. They settled on the following definition:
"A shortage exists when the number of workers available (the
supply) increases less rapidly than the number demanded at
the salaries paid in the recent past. Then salaries will
rise, and activities which were once performed by (say) en-
gineers must now be performed by a class of workers less well
trained and less expensive." [14]. They relied primarily on
a comparison of the earning of engineers with the earnings
of other professional groups and wage earners in order to
test the hypothesis of a shortage of engineers. By defini-
tion a shortage existed if the relative earnings of engineers
had risen. In the light of their definition and their con-
cern with only long-run trends, their conclusion was that
there has been no significant shortage. Furthermore since
1950 the relative change in salaries of engineers has been
so slight that the shortage could not have been serious.
Also by their definition, the rise in average starting sal-
aries for college graduates from 1950 to 1956 merely indi-
cated that there was a general shortage of college graduates.
Finally the fourth meaning of shortage may embody some
social criterion. For example, some people may say there are
not as many engineers and scientists as this nation should
have in order to do all the things that need doing, such as
maintaining our rapid rate of technological progress, rais-
ing our standard of living, keeping us militarily strong,
24

etc. One might really read these statements as the demand
(in the economic sense) for technically skilled manpower
ought to be greater than it is — it is really a shortage of
demand for scientists and engineers which concerns them.
Another implicit definition is that since the U.S. does
not have as many engineers and scientists as the Soviet
Union, it therefore has a shortage. One other explanation
possibly exists similar to that explanation of the "servant
shortage" of World War II days. When higher wages in alter-
native lines of employment developed for those who had pre-
viously been servants, they were lured away and could no
longer be hired for household help at their previous wages.
Rather than admit they would not pay the wages necessary to
keep help, many found it more felicitous to speak of a
"shortage.
"
As Alchian, Arrow, and Capron developed their model of
dynamic shortages and price rises, they also defined the ra-
tio of the rate of price rise to the excess of demand over
supply as reaction speed. Focusing on the average price
being paid for engineering services, it was clear that this
price would tend to rise so long as there was an excess of
demand over supply, but it would not rise instantaneously to
the level that would bring supply and demand into equality.
The greater the excess of demand over supply, the greater
the rate of increase of price per unti of time. Alternately,
price will cease to rise when the price is such that demand
equals supply. Keeping in mind the above definition of
25

reaction speed, the amount of shortage will tend to disappear
faster the greater the reaction speed and also the greater
the elasticity of supply. In a linear approximation then if
D is demand, S is supply, t is time and p the average price:
(1) dp/dt = k(D-S),
(2) D=ap+c,
(3) S = bp + d.
Equation (1) expresses the assumption about the relation be-
tween price rises and the difference between supply and de-
mand; equations (2) and (3) are the simple demand and supply
functions. If X is the shortage (D-S) then
(4) X = - (a + b)p + (c - d).
Differentiating with respect to time and substituting in (1)
yields:
(5) dX/dt = -k(a + b)X .
Hence, for any given shortage X, the speed of convergence is
greater the greater k(a+b). Specifically, other things being
equal, the smaller the value of b, the slower will be the
convergence of the shortage X to zero. To deal with a steady
upward shift in demand equation (2) is expanded to:
(6) D = - ap + c + et
where e is the rate of increase of demand with time for any
given price. Again letting X be the shortage equation (4)
becomes
(7) X = - (a + b)p + (c - d) + et
26

Differentiating with respect to time yields:
(8) dX/dt = - (a + b) (dp/dt) + e
If X = D - S then equation (1) can be rewritten as:
(9) dp/dt = kX
Substituting now again: into equation (8):
(10) dX/dt = - (a + b) kX + e
Assume that there is no shortage at the beginning, so S = D
or X = 0. Then equation (10) shows DX/dt > 0, so that the
shortage X begins increasing and must continue to increase.
It also follows that
(11) lim X(t) = e/(a + b)k
t">-<»
so that the shortages tend to a limit which is greater the
greater the rate of increase of demand (e) and the slower the
speed of adjustment would have been with an unshifting demand
schedule. Differentiating equation (9) with respect to time
once again and substituting in (8):
(12) d 2 p/dt 2 = k dX/dt = k(a + b)(dp/dt) = ke
As reasoned earlier now dp/dt must be increasing over time,
positive for all t, therefore the price p must be increasing
steadily. If p* is the price which would clear the market
(i.e. make X = 0) then (7) becomes:
(13) = - (a + b) p* = (c - d) + et
or multiplying through by k:
(14) = -k (a + b) p* + k(c - d) + ket
27

If q is the excess of the market-clearing price over the
actual price i.e. q = p* - p, substituting from (7) into (9):
(15) dp/dt = -k(a + b)p + k(c - d) + ket
Finally subtracting (14) from (15) and using the definition
of q:
(16) dp/dt = k(a + b)q
Since dp/dt is positive and increases from zero to a limit,
the same must be true of q [15] .
Thus the actual price will always remain below the mar-
ket-clearing price and the gap will actually widen with time,
but the two time paths will converge. That is, the contin-
uing increase in demand causes the price to increase steadily
and indefinitely, but it always remains below the price that
would clear the market.
Perhaps at this point it would be beneficial to briefly
trace the sequence of events observed in the market as a re-
sult of the shift in the demand curve. A particular firm
may not know exactly how many more engineers it could prof-
itably hire, but is only aware that it wants more. Advertis-
ing at the going salary, there are no takers, so the firm
realizes that in order to hire it must pay higher salaries.
The firm must naturally reconsider its desire to hire, given
that salaries have risen, i.e. will the marginal product of
additional engineers cover the higher level of salaries?
The firm will decide eventually to hire, but the process has
taken time. The time lag in the firm's reaction therefore
28

is spent partly in learning about the supply conditions in
the markets, partly in determining the profitability of addi-
tional hiring, and partly in the internal hiring mechanism
of the firm itself.
Now the firm may not have hired as many as would have
achieved maximum profitability. Even if they had, the market
as a whole would still not be in equilibrium, since consid-
ering the old employees earning the old salary, there is more
than one price being paid for identical services. The market
mechanism adjusts with other firms hiring the lower paid en-
gineers at higher salaries, or their original firm keeps
them by matching this higher salary. In any event, these
information flows and decision processes take time.
The total lag in the response of salaries to a shortage
is then compounded out of the time it takes the firm to rec-
ognize the existence of a shortage, the time it takes to de-
cide upon the need for higher salaries and the number of
vacancies at such salaries, and the time it takes employees
to recognize the salary alternatives available and act upon
this information or the time it takes the firm to equalize
theirs with outside offers.
Having offered this preliminary explanation of the single
shift of the demand curve, Alchian, Arrow, and Capron then
considered the situation of continuing change in demand (or
supply). They suggest that that was the case for engineer-
scientists since about 1950, i.e., if the demand curve is
rising steadily then as the market price approaches the
29

equilibrium price, equilibrium price steadily moves away from
the market price. A chronic shortage then exists in the
sense that buyers at any given moment will desire more of
the commodity at the average price being paid than is being
offered, and the amount of the shortage will not approach
zero. And this condition would continue as long as demand
is increasing. In the market for engineer-scientists, then
there existed a dynamic shortage, that is a situation in
which there are unfilled vacancies in positions where sala-
ries are the same as those being currently paid in others of
the same type and quality. The magnitude of the dynamic
shortage depends upon the rate of increase in demand, the
reaction speed in the market, and the elasticity of supply
and demand. The reaction speed in any particular market de-
pends partly on institutional arrangements, such as the prev-
alence of long term contracts, and partly on the rapidity
with which information about salaries, vacancies, and avail-
ability of personnel becomes generally available throughout
the market. The adjustment process took a day in Marshall's
example of the corn market, whereas it was much longer in
the market for engineers and scientists.
They further reason that the dynamic shortage is a pos-
sible explanation because (1) there had been a rapid and
steady rise in demand, (2) the elasticity of supply was low
especially for short periods, and (3) the reaction speed on
the engineer-scientist market may be expected to be slow.
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(1) Now the increase in demand for engineers and scien-
tists was for those utilized in research and engineering,
explained chiefly by the action of the government in con-
tracting for reserach and development work by private indus-
try.
(2) The elasticity of the supply of engineer-scientists
with respect to price changes was expected to be small but
not zero over short periods of time, owing to the length of
time it took to train new personnel.
(3) Three factors may cause the reaction speed to be
slower for the engineer-scientist market. They were the
prevalence of long-term contracts, the influence of the her-
erogeneity of the market in slowing the diffusion of informa-
tion, and the dominance of a relatively small number of large
firms in research and development. Any one firm may feel
that increasing salaries in order to attract more scientists
and engineers will set off competitive bidding resulting in
no substantial change in distribution but a considerably
higher salary bill. It is also to be noted that not only is
the number of firms small, but the typical firm size is large,
In particular, a single buyer, the government, directly and
indirectly accounts for about half of the total demand.
As far as policy implications are concerned; different
approaches were to be used depending on whether a dynamic
shortage exists or a shortage due to a price control. If
artificially imposed restrictions either on demand or supply
in some market were causing rigidity such that price was
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prevented from rising sufficiently to restore the market to
anequilibrium, one should have considered the removal of such
restrictions. On the other hand, if a dynamic shortage ex-
isted, only a lag in adjusting to new circumstances was in-
volved — an inherent characteristic of the market and only
when lags result in prolonged and serious departure from
equilibrium conditions, should intervention occur. The only
possible policy they suggested was to allow prices to rise.
They offered two reasons why "excess demand" should be elim-
inated by the necessary rise in salaries: (1) salary increases
serve as the signals which call forth the increase in supply
in the long run and (2) those using the services of scientists
and engineers should be faced with the true price of those
services if they are to use them economically
.
Alchian and Arrow concluded that the dynamic shortage de-
veloped due to the very rapid increase in demand in the mar-
ket and the failure of the price of services to adjust upward
as rapidly and by as large an amount as warranted by the in-
creasing demand, given the supply schedule of such services.
In view of the relative rigidity in supply and despite the
great price rise, the market must be permitted to react to
the increase in demand, thereby allocating engineer-scien-
tists in the short run and bringing forth the increased sup-
ply in the long run.
Before classifying the present physician shortage as
similar to the "dynamic shortage" of engineers, one must
eliminate from consideration the other types of shortages
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enumerated in the Alchian, Arrow, Capron study. Since they
labeled chronic vacancies (where more was demanded than
could be supplied at going salaries) as one type of shortage,
one might convincingly argue that this is the case in the
physician market. They maintain that such a shortage will
result from wage control or other restrictions that prevent
prices from rising. Although wage controls for health care
were in effect for a short period, it was not of sufficient
time to cause the shortages presently witnessed. Restrictive
policies will be addressed in the next chapter. Another
meaning of shortage introduced was that of a price rise
forcing some consumers out of the market. Although prices
of physicians' services have risen, the enfranchisement of
the population through third party payments such as Medicare
or Medicaid has more than offset this effect. The final
meaning of shortage was that there are less than there "ought"
to be, clearly outside the economist's meaning of shortage.
The meaning upon which Alchian, Arrow and Capron settled
with this: a shortage resulting from sluggishness in market
adjustments when there are rapidly rising demands, or a "dy-
namic shortage." They documented in detail the parameters
which determine the magnitude of this "dynamic shortage." In
review they were the rate of increase in demand, the elastic-
ity of supply and the reaction speed in the market.
In the market for physicians there has been a myriad of
documents discussing the increased demand with the introduc-
tion of Medicare, Medicaid, 0E0 programs and third party
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payments during the past decade. These methods of financing
have resulted in a rapid and steady rise in demand. Such an
increase would put a strain on the smooth functioning of any
market. The elasticity of supply with respect to price
changes may be expected to be small over short periods of
time, owing to medical school entrance policies and the length
of time it takes to train physicians. In any event the re-
sponsiveness of supply is less than for commodities such as
manufactured goods, due to the importance of non-economic
factors in choosing a career and uncertainty of rewards in
the distant future. Finally, reaction speed as they defined
it, depends partly on institutional arrangements such as the
prevalence of long term contracts, and partly on the rapidity
with which information becomes available. In the physician
market the only factor playing a part would be the transfer-
ence of information; there simply are not long term contracts
in the practice of private medicine.
Whereas these economists argued that the market should
be allowed to operate freely in letting prices rise to call
forth more engineers eventually, there is some hesitancy on
the part of economists to say that prices paid physicians
should also rise to call forth and increase in supply. Why?
Partly due to the rates they already receive, but partly due
to the fact that present policies would simply not allow




IV. THE AMA AND MEDICAL SCHOOLS
Throughout the economy, the supply of goods and services
is governed by the net return from their production as com-
pared with net returns realized from using the same resources
elsewhere, the traditional concept of opportunity costs. As
discussed above, the market is cleared at the price equating
supply and demand, given conditions where the sellers are
willing to supply certain goods and services and buyers want
and are able to pay for them. Price serves as a rationing
function. The market pricing mechanism also applied to
medical care services. In response to higher prices due to
increased demand, additional supplies would tend to be called
forth, although certain factors prevent the system from op-
erating as conventional theory suggests.
Imperfections exist in the medical care market on both
the demand and supply sides. For example on the demand side,
the physician assumes the unique role as a decision maker in
determining what medical goods and services the patient needs,
although patients still have the option of accepting or re-
jecting the doctor's advice. Physicians are in a position to
decide when a condition requires hospital confinement and how
long a patient has to stay — a decision which in part affects
the amount of goods and services supplied. Naturally then to
the extent that the ability of supply to create its own de-
mand in the above sense exists, attempts to relieve shortages
by increasing supply are particularly frustrated. On the
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supply side we will investigate the non-competitive elements
of the market. Entry into the market is restricted not only
through medical schools but also through licensing, certifi-
cation, or membership requirements in professional societies.
Membership in county or state societies is sometimes neces-
sary for the use of hospital facilities [16]'.
In examining the supply side then of this imperfect mar-
ket, one sees some institutional aspects affecting the fac-
tors of supply. In their study Increasing the Supply of
Medical Personnel
,
Stewart and Siddayao say that the aggre-
gate flow rate at which physicians are supplied is affected
by:
(1) time lags in graduating personnel and building facil-
ities
(2) entry limitations to medical schools and the rate of
attrition in such schools
(3) licensing requirements for physicians
(4) rate of retirements and deaths in the profession
(5) returns to those supplying medical care
(6) the existence of a vertical gap in the hierarchy of
medical personnel [17].
Significantly the American Medical Association has direct
influence over four of the above mentioned, indirect influence
on the returns to physicians and no influence over the re-
tirements or deaths in the profession.
Reuben Kessel has done extensive analysis on the economic
implications of the control exercised by the AMA over the
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education, licensure, and pattern of practice of American
physicians. In particular, he argues persuasively that,
armed with the famous Flexner Report, the AMA has acquired
significant monopoly power over medical markets, resulting
in the existence of substantial "monopoly returns to an in-
vestment in medical education" [18].
Before examining the Flexner Report and its implications
for the AMA, one must look at the production of physicians
prior to Flexner' s publication in 1910. Medicine, like the
profession of economics today, was a relatively competitive
industry, until the founding of the AMA. With very few ex-
ceptions anyone who wanted to practice was free to hang out
a shingle and declare himself available. Medical schools
were easy to start, easy to get into, and provided, as might
be expected in a free market, a varied menu of medical train-
ing that covered the complete quality spectrum. These vari-
ations could be broken into two basic types of educational
programs. In one, often conducted by independent proprietary
institutions and sometimes owned by the faculty themselves,
the student undertook a didactic program that lasted one or
two years. In some cases attendance was not considered nec-
essary as long as the prescribed examinations were success-
fully completed. In the second program, one would simply
apprentice to another physician. Consequently in one case,
medical education was unrelated to medical care whereas in
the other, medical education was incidental to participation
in the provision of medical care.
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In 1847 the American Medical Assocaition was founded and
immediately committed itself to two propositions that were
to lead to sharp restrictions upon the freedom of would-be
doctors to enter the medical profession and the freedom of
patients to choose doctors whom the AMA felt were not ade-
quately qualified to practice medicine. These propositions
were (1) that medical students should have acquired a "suit-
able preliminary education," and (2) that a "uniform elevated
standard of requirements for the degree of M.D. should be
adopted by all medical schools in the United States [19].
These objectives were achieved in two stages [20] . Dur-
ing the first stage, the primary concern of the AMA was li-
censure of physicians. In the second, it was accrediting
schools of medicine. During the first stage, which began
with the founding of the AMA and lasted until the turn of
the century, organized medicine was able by lobbying before
state legislatures to persuade legislators to license the
practice of medicine. Consequently the various states set
up boards of medical examiners to administer examinations to
determine whether or not applicants were qualified to prac-
tice medicine and to grant licenses to those the State Board
deemed qualified to practice. Generally speaking, organized
medicine was very successful in its campaign to induce states
to license physicians.
But it was not until the second stage that economically
effective power over entry into the practice of medicine was
acquired by organized medicine. This stage began with the
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founding in 1904 of the Council of Medical Education of the
AMA. This group dedicated itself to the task of improving
the quality of medical education offered by the medical
schools of the day. In 1906, this committee undertook an
inspection of the 160 medical schools then in existence and
fully approved of the training in only 82 schools. Thirty-
two were deemed to be completely unacceptable. In order to
gain wide acceptance of the results of this study, the coun-
cil solicited the aid of the Carnegie Foundation: "If we
could obtain the publication and approval of our work by the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, it would
assist materially in securing the results we were attempting
to bring about" [21].
Subsequently Abraham Flexner, representing the Carnegie
Foundation, with the aide of N. P. Colwell, secretary of the
Council on Medical Education, repeated the AMA's inspection
and grading of medical schools. In 1910, the results of the
labors of Flexner and Colwell were published.
Shrylock interprets the history of medical education
during the period from 1870 to 1910 as a struggle between
existing practitioners, represented by the AMA, and medical
educators for control over the output of doctors and hence
over the medical schools themselves [22]. The victor in
this struggle was the AMA, and its most powerful weapon in
the battle was the Flexner Report. The report discredited
many medical schools and was instrumental in establishing
the AMA as the arbiter of which schools could have their
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graduates sit for state licensure examinations. Graduation
from class A medical school, with the rating determined by
a subdivision of the AMA, became a prerequisite for licen-
sure. Evidence of the triumph of the AMA against the medi-
cal educators was the elimination of the power of medical
schools to license their own graduates.
A major thrust of the report was to recommend that medi-
cal education should be based much more than it had in the
past upon the rapidly developing biomedical sciences. Sec-
ondly, medical education was to be related much more inti-
mately to extensive hospital clinical experience combined
with laboratory work. This recognition of the need to pro-
vide a modern scientific and clinical base as the foundation
of medical education, and thus medical care , naturally called
for a new range of scientific resources and new forms of
organization, in terms of both facilities and personnel.
The conclusion followed that many of the proprietary medical
schools could no longer serve a useful purpose and should be
discontinued. Flexner rated only 72 schools (45 percent)
completely acceptable. This led to an adoption of the four-
year medical school curriculum, the introduction of labora-
tory teaching exercises, improvement in the quality of
instruction through the development of a greater proportion
of full-time faculty, first in the biological sciences and
later in the clinical fields, and the expansion of clinical
teaching through the introduction of clinical clerkship.
The number of medical schools was cut in half from 1900 to
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1925, as a result of AMA regulation [23]. Thus the changes
that the Flexner Report visualized were achieved through an
institutional accreditation process and by the formalization
of procedures for licensing the medical practitioner. Con-
firmation of the fact that the AMA was interested in seeking
control over medical schools is provided by the former head
of the AMA's Council on Medical Education:
"In this rapid elevation of the standard of med-
ical education. . . .with the reduction of the number
of medical schools from 160 to eighty there occurred
a marked reduction in the number of medical students
and medical graduates. We had anticipated this and
felt that this was a desirable thing. We had....
a
great oversupply of poor medical practitioners..." [24]
According to Shrylock,
"Competing within a free economy they observed
that the scientific motive for educational reform
coincided with their own professional ambitions.
They became increasingly aware that too many schools
were turning out too many graduates to make practice
profitable." [25]
The physician to population ratio has been widely pro-
claimed as a rough standard of the adequacy of health serv-
ices generally, and of the adequacy of physician services,
in particular. Its close relationship to notions of need
and quality enjoy a long precedent perhaps initiated by the
late Henry S. Pritchett, former head of the Carnegie Founda-
tion which financed the development of the Flexner Report
who states in his introduction,
"...it seems clear that as nations advance in
civilization, they will be driven to throw around
the admission to these great professions such safe-
guards as will limit the number of those who enter
them to some reasonable estimate of the number who
are actually needed. It goes without saying that
no system of standards of admission to a profession
41

can exclude all the unfit or furnish a perfect body
of practitioners, but a reasonable enforcement of
such standards will at least relieve the body politic
of a large part of the difficulty which comes from
overproduction, and will safeguard the right of soci-
ety to the service of trained men in the great call-
ings which touch so closely our physical and political
life." [26]
But it is not clear that quality of care drops as the
number of physicians exceeds those "needed." Economists
make much of the fact that the quantity of medical services
consumed depends on factors in addition to the "quantity
needed" and the fact that the number of "fit" applicants to
medical school greatly exceeds the number of actual admis-
sions by three-fold.
It is generally held that an increase in quality requires
an increase in price, all other variables held constant.
And an increase in price implies an increase in efforts to
economize on a resource that has become more scarce. In the
case of physician care, an increase in quality implies a
greater effort to economize on physician's services. Spe-
cifically people would tend to substitute self-diagnosis and
treatment for the services of a physician. Therefore, in-
creasing the quality of physicians does not necessarily im-
ply that the quality of medical care that the public as a
whole receives also increases, since the public receives a
mixture of professional attention and self treatment.
Naturally then, the advent of licensure and the closure
of the medical schools that failed to meet AMA standards was
justified by the AMA as a measure to protect the public from
the ministrations of unqualified or incompetent physicians.
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Grandfather clauses protected the rights of existing physi-
cians to continue to practice medicine regardless of the
adequacy of their training, so the full effect of the report
could not have been realized until many years later.
These restrictive policies were particularly oppressive
for Negroes and Jews and probably women. Whereas the number
of medical schools were cut in half, the number of Negro
medical schools went from seven to two, and the number of
students admitted to those also decreased [27]
.
As a result of the Flexner report and the restrictions
of opportunities for medical education in this country,
foreign medical schools, particularly in the late 1930's,
were deluged by American applicants. If one divides grad-
uate training in United States institutions into the cate-
gories of business administration, agriculture, education,
engineering, physical and natural sciences, economics, and
medicine, then foreign enrollments in American institutions
exceed American enrollments in foreign institutions by a
wide margin for all fields but one — medicine. Americans
studying abroad range from one-fourth to one-thirtieth of
foreigners studying in the United States for six of the seven
categories. But the ratio of Americans studying medicine
abroad to foreigners studying medicine in the United States
exceeded three to one for the year 1966. Apparently the re-
striction of opportunities this country continues to affect




Many distinguished writers have argued for giving the
public the freedom to choose anyone as a physician without
the constraints imposed by the state, i.e. for free entry
into the practice of medicine. This view appears in the
letter of Adam Smith to Cullen [29] and in a letter of Wil-
liam James to his fellow physicians in Boston [30]. It is
also Milton Friedman's position [31]. By using licensure as
a barrier to entry, our society has to a large extent aban-
doned freedom of choice of physicians. On the other hand,
if licensure were available to any applicant, whether the
school he attended was accredited or not, it would encour-
age and pressure medical schools to graduate students cap-
able of passing the examinations and not present the current
"double" barrier to entry.
Again Kessel argues that organized medicine has not been
consistent in protecting the public from making poor choices
of physicians. First, in view of substantial evidence of
discrimination against interns on the basis of race, creed,
and color in admission to medical schools, organized medicine
reduced the quality of student input [32]. Second, when,
standards were instituted they were applied only to new
graduates, not existing practitioners. Third, there contin-
ues to be no re-examination for physicians. To be consis-
tent with a concern for high quality, there should be a
re-exarnination with recertif ication to insure physicians
keep current. Fourth, politics have been intertwined with
decisions which should be made on quality alone, i.e. the
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requirement that a doctor be a member of his county medical
society in order to qualify for membership in a special
board. Fifth, staff appointments to a hospital are similar
to admissions procedures to a country club — race, religion,
family, type of practice, etc. are as important or more so
than skill and talent [33]. Finally, the great internal
solidarity and cohesion within the medical profession reduce
the incentive to produce quality work and develop an out-
standing reputation.
To show the further effects of organized medicine run-
ning of medical schools, Kessel contrasts post- and pre-MD
training. If educators were in control, with their much
stronger interest in producing doctors, they would act to
make the output of physicians responsive to consumer desires.
There are a plethora of advanced programs for post-MD train-
ing under the aegis of hospitals rather than medical schools.
Spaces for post-MD training exceeded the output of American
medical schools by quite a wide margin [34]. Consequently
one finds large numbers of non-American graduates of foreign
medical schools taking intern and residency training in this
country. Approved residencies in hospitals increased six
hundred percent between 1940 and 1960, while the output of
medical graduates rose only thirty-five percent. Kessel
holds that an explanation of this anomaly is the hypotheses
that there exist economic benefits to the medical profession
for post-MD training that are virtually nonexistent for pre-
MD training, e.g. students in their first two years of
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training are dead-weight to a hospital staff, while those
who have finished their first four years are extremely use-
ful and therefore highly prized. It is an anomaly, educa-
tionally, that the more advanced the training, the greater
is the availability of facilities and the more specialized
and advanced training often takes place outside medical
schools.
Why should there be more facilities for post-MD training
than for pre-MD training? A possible hypothesis is there
exist economic benefits to the medical profession for post-
MD training that are virtually non-existent for pre-MD train-
ing. Doctors that are members of the attending staff of a
hospital with a large intern and residency program may have
an important competitive advantage stemming from their lower
cost of producing patient care, since they can delegate
duties to the house staff they would ordinarily have to per-
form for themselves. Therefore the staffs of hospitals
without educational programs push hard to obtain such pro-
grams. Simply stated, there are no economic benefits of a
comparable magnitude for pre-MD programs. First and second
year medical students are in fact dead-weight with with re-
spect to instructional costs. Fein and Weber show that
tuition and fees account for only four percent of all medi-
cal school funds [35].
A further point worth noting is the natural conflict of
interest in which the AMA is involved. It has presumed to
simultaneously represent (1) the public, in maintaining
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standards for the production of physicians and in determin-
ing the quantity to be produced, and (2) the medical profes-
sion, the purveyors of medical services. In other words,
the AMA represents both the buyers and sellers of physicians'
services. It is hard to believe that the AMA, in this anom-
alous position, does not in fact primarily support physicians
given that its own members are physicians.
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, V. ELEMENTS OF A STRUCTURAL SUPPLY FUNCTION
Having examined then the background of physician supply
studies, the physician shortage as compared to the engineer
shortage of the 1950' s and the restrictive policies of the
AMA, one arrives at the fundamental question: What factors
influence a student to decide to become a physician? After
considering possible explanations, a framework which an
economist might utilize will be presented. Then an analytic
form of a supply function will be introduced suggesting ex-
planatory variables for both the short run and the long run
solutions. An economist emphasizes the financial incentives,
both present and future, as well as non-monetary but quanti-
fiable parameters. These are items concerning which one
could gather data and finally test hypotheses. Consequently
this area will be emphasized in this paper. That is not to
say that there are no other considerations. To the contrary,
physicians have traditionally extolled the virtues of their
profession as an opportunity to help mankind. Although some
medical students may show a tendency toward "people orienta-
tion," one is hard pressed to quantify this trait and its
effect on potential applicants. Educators may suggest that
aptitude as evidenced by undergraduate grades, Medical Col-
lege Admission Test (MCAT) scores and their influence on the
probability of being accepted into medical school and its
successful completion are important.. And any education is
partially for consumption as well as for investment. One
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cannot easily discount these factors and their probable
relevance, given the uncertainty regarding their weights.
Finally, there are a host of non-monetary and non-qualifi-
able factors which enter into the decision, i.e. parental
status, pressure, and influence; family status (single or
married); cultural and attitudinal consideration; the non-
monetary costs and benefits associated with being a physi-
cian as compared with those which could be expected in
alternative careers.
A. FOUNDATION
Tibor Scitovsky, in his survey of trends in internation-
al professional earnings found "that it pays to be a high
civil servant in England, a university professor in Germany
and a physician in the United States" [36] . In this chapter
then, all the quantifiable considerations (monetary and
otherwise) of the potential applicant will be examined,
taking the non-quantifiable considerations as a constant or
given.
The most immediate concern, which has considerable im-
pact, is the "cost" of attending medical school. These
"out-of-pocket" costs are those which must be borne by the
student after scholarships, grants, etc. They include not
only tuition and books, but those living expenses which can
vary widely depending on family status and location. Crocker
and Smith found the average annual school expenses faced by
the M.D. candidate in 1967-68 averaged $4,394 [37].
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As an aside, these costs affect the socioeconomic char-
acteristic of the representative M.D. candidate and lead to
a biased distribution of these characteristics in the cur-
rent medical student body. Not only do these costs impact
on the decisions of potential applicants to medical school,
but they affect the behavior of persons who complete their
medical training and enter practice. Fein and Weber present
a typical scenario: High costs of medical education bar many
able but needy students from the field. Thus physicians are
drawn largely from one stratum of the society, which does
not fully understand the medical and other problems of the
low income or minority groups. Such physicians, therefore,
do not serve those persons adequately. Furthermore, having
gone into debt during their long period of education and
being older than others beginning to earn incomes when they
finally enter medical practice, they tend to exact high
fees.
As Table III shows, however there are undoubtedly other
factors which cause the number of applicants to medical
school to change radically.
Although actual openings have some positive effect,
legislation opening the capital market seems to have a more
pronounced effect. The enactment of "The Health Profession
Educational Assistance Act," of 1963 provided federal loans
and scholarships. The next two school years witnessed jumps
of nearly 2000 in numbers of applicants. The Health Manpower
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the next two school years. Finally, after passage of the
Comprehensive Health Manpower Act of 1971 with emphasis on
capitation grants for increased enrollment, there were in-
creases of nearly 5000 applicants in each of the next two
years. It would seem that each separate piece of legisla-
tion was effective in convincing a certain number of students
of the possibility they now have of becoming a physician.
It is understood that other factors enter in, but the impact
of legislation opening the capital market cannot be dismis-
sed in the enfranchisemnet of physicians.
Although medical students, through tuition, provide only
about five percent of the total income of medical schools,
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they bear the major portion of the costs of medical educa-
tion. This is because (1) a substantial portion of the tot-
al expenditures of medical schools supports the production
of outputs other than medical education and (2) opportunity
costs must be included in the computation of the costs of
medical education. Fein and V/eber (in 1966) computed that
opportunity costs, as measured by the median earnings of
males with at least four years of college, represent 93 per-
cent of the personal costs of medical education in public
medical schools, 83 percent in private schools, and 100 per-
cent for interns and residents [39].
A greater recognition of the importance of foregone in-
come and of the long period of education and training after
completion of the four years of undergraduate medical school
would help focus attention on the problems associated with
internship and residency training. Though there is little
that the individual prospective physician can do to shorten
the time spent in medical school, he can shorten the period
between the receipt of the degree and his entry into inde-
pendent practice by his decision regarding specialization or
general practice. Economic considerations are important and
influence the length of training beyond the M.D. and the ca-
reer choices of the physician. Lyden, Geiger and Peterson
found that debt at graduation was associated with the choice
of the type of internship. The respondents who indicated
that they had curtailed their training below what they had
desired most often indicated that they were deterred for
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economic reasons. Family financial support played a most
important role in making long residency training possible;
in 80 percent of the cases those with four or more years of
residency had parental support for the major portion of
their educational costs [40]
.
Financial considerations have other important impacts as
well. The opportunity costs for studying while in high
school may require that the individual in a low-income fam-
ily substitute work for study, thus perhaps reducing academ-
ic performance and the probability of college acceptance.
In addition, of course, the chance of attending college is
lessened by the need to meet out-of-pocket costs and by the
opportunity costs involved in such attendance. The student
from a low-income family may have to go to work to help sup-
port his family and will have considerable difficulty in
borrowing funds to finance his college expenses. Even if
admitted to college, he may have to substitute work for study
and perhaps, as a result reduce the level of his academic
performance. Thus, he may lower his probability of accept-
ance into a medical school which places a premium on previous
academic accomplishment as an indicator of academic potential
and whose admissions committee does not accept "effort" as a
partial substitute for "accomplishment." Finally, of course,
the student must face the considerable expenses involved in
attending medical school and the very significant opportun-
ity costs that stretch over a relatively long period of time.
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To put it in another way, a student considering the ex-
tension of his formal education can be expected to take ac-
count of the streams of monetary costs and benefits which
will accrue from his decision. There are a variety of ways
that these streams can be combined to provide a ranking of
alternative actions. The most frequently used procedure is
to compute the internal rate of return. This procedure re-
quires the computation of the discount rate which equates
the present value of the revenue stream and the present val-
ue of the cost stream. The costs would have to include both
the explicit expenditures for education (tuition, books,
materials) and the implicit costs of foregone earnings. A
typical method for the student to choose in calculating the
future benefit stream is the current age-income relationship
(possibly adjusted for a real growth rate).
Table IV from Medical Economics listing the median net
incomes of physicians from 1962-1971 includes the CPI de-
flated incomes and may also.be used by the student.
"Medical Economics" feels that this past growth rate
(5.4 percent 1962-1966) was a reliable indicator for the fu-
ture, for they said in 1968, "All things considered, the
median net income of all private M.D.'s under 65 will prob-
ably rise an average of 5.4 percent in each of the next ten
years. That's a lower rate of gain than in the past, based
on the assumption that more restraint will be exercised in
raising fees. Conservatively, the typical private M.D. under
54

age 65 will net a projected $65,000 before income taxes in
1978" [41].
TABLE IV
Actual and Deflated Median Incomes of Physicians by Year






















Median incomes deflated by CPI (base year 1967) [42]
Another factor which may affect decisions is the per-
ceived variability of income, particularly if the prospective
applicant feels he will have to go into debt in order to fi-
nance the completion of his medical education. A better
measure than standard deviation, in view of the skewed dis-
tribution of physicians' incomes, is the proportion of phy-
sicians whose earnings are under a specified low level or
over a specified high level. Again "Medical Economics" pro-
vides the results of a survey which showed in 1966 only
three percent of physicians in full-time practice earned
less than $10,000 and fifteen percent earned less than
$20,000. Thirty percent earned $40,000 or more and fifteen
percent earned $50,000 or more [43].
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In his doctoral disertation, Sloan included a study of
internal rates of return to physicians' education. Using
the incomes of physicians in different age groups through
age 65 in a particular year to construct a revenue stream
and the incomes of college graduates at different ages for
the major part of the cost stream, he produced the following
table:
TABLE V
Sloan's Estimates of Internal Rates of Return to Physicians'










Hansen calculated a comparison of rates of return to
physicians, dentists and male college graduates resulting in
the following:




In a more recent study Sloan found that the internal
rate of return on M.D. degrees with specialization was.
roughly 24 percent in 1965 [46]. Whereas Borland and Yett
calculated the rate of return earned by males on a B.S. de-







estimates of internal rates of return earned on medical edu-
cation ranging from a low of 15.1 percent to 33.6 percent
for physicians [49].
B. FORMULATION
How then might one specify a system of structural equa-
tions to explain the supply of physicians in a particular
year? It is clear that the number of physicians supplied in
year t (S, ) is an identity composed of those medical gradu-
ates, domestic and foreign, who are licensed. That is, the
supply can be broken down as follows:
n . n
S+ = GPDL,. + . E- SPDL7 + GPFMGL+ + .Z- SPFMGLT;t t 1=1 t t 1=1 t
where
GPDL = domestic medical graduates who are licensed
for general practice in year t
SPDL. = domestic medical graduates who are licensed
t
for the ith specialty practice in year t
GPFMGL. = foreign medical graduates who are licensed for
general practice in year t
SPFMGL = foreign medical graduates who are licensed for
the ith specialty practice in year t
n = number of specialties in the medical profession
Looking first at domestic medical graduates, one can
identify a number of factors which determine its magnitude.
For example, the number of domestic graduate students who
are licensed depends on the number of graduate students
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three years ago since this is the minimum time between grad-
uation and licensure for any physician. Further, this quan-
tity is dependent on the net median income of general
practitioners and finally on the compensation received in
residency compared to that which could presently be earned










GS,_ C. = medical student graduates in year t-3
NMI^P = net median income of general practitioners in
year t
NMI = net median income of a physician in the ith
specialty in year t
R
RS = salary earned in residency relative to potential
salary with present training in year t
When looking at specialties one must be concerned with
graduates from medical school four and five years ago to ac-
count for the additional years required in residency for
specialty licensure. In this case net median income of the
specialty as compared to net median income of general prac-
tice must be considered. Again the relative compensation
earned in residency must be considered. So,
SPDL* = s*(GS ., NMlfP , NMli, RS*)
t t -rl t t t
where
GS . = medical school graduates in the year lagged
t
associated with the ith specialty training
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NMI^P = net median income of general practitioners in
year t
NMI = net median income of a physician in the ith
specialty in year t
RS, = salary earned in residency working toward the
ith specialty relative to the potential salary
with present training in year t
Note that the subscript t 1 would indicate the vector lag
associated the additional years in residence required for
specific specialties. Also RS, would have more significance
in the specialty equations than it would in the general
practice equations.
Foreign medical graduates licensed is naturally depend-
ent on the number of medical graduates allowed to immigrate
into the U.S. and the subset of those which are allowed to
stay upon fulfilling their internship and residency require-
ments. Congressional action has had a great part to play in
the determination of this quantity. For example, whereas
nearly 2000 foreign medical graduates returned to their re-
spective countries per year prior to 1970 legislation, only
300 per year have elected to do so since. Legislation in
the 1970 's relaxed restrictive quotas for skilled immigrants
threrby encouraging more professionals and especially physi-
cians to remain in the United States to practice. Therefore,
whether considering general practice or specialties:











FMG . = foreign medical graduates immigrating into the
t
_•
United States in year t 1
CA = congressional action allowing more foreign
medical graduates to stay in the United States
Clearly this is a section which will require more investi-
gation and research. It is not clear whether foreign physi-
cians have come to the United States primarily to learn with
the intention of returning to their native countries or
whether they have immigrated not only to learn as interns
and residents but to stay in the United States to practice
after comparing expected earnings in the United States with
those possible in their native countries. It is necessary
to investigate whether the allowable limit of immigrants is
reached and if not, what influences the changes year by year.
Graduating students in any year clearly is another iden-
tity composed of the number of entering students less the







ES._. = number of students entering medical school in
year t-4




It is to be noted that the variable entering students (ES)
has been identical to capacity (C) as set forth by the AMA,
i.e. capacity is the total number of entering students which
have been accepted. So:
ES
t-4 ~ Ct-4
where C._. = capacity of medical schools as measured by
first year acceptances
Capacity of medical schools is a function of a base ca-
pacity (intercept) in an intital year, and seems to be af-
fected by a lagged number of applicants. That is with an
increased number of applicants, there is a corresponding in-
crease in pressure on medical schools to enlarge their en-
rollment. Should the applicant-to-opening ratio climb as
high as five, medical schools might find it difficult to main-
tain their present restrictive policies and might yield to
public pressure to accept more students and/or construct
additional buildings. Of course increase in capacity would
also be influenced by the advances in technology as well as
inflation. Through technological advances, medical schools
may be able to handle more students with existing facilities,
Conversely equipment costs associated with construction may
prohibit new construction given revenue expectations. Fi-
nally as evidenced earlier, congressional legislation can
have a profound effect on influencing medical schools to in-
crease their enrollments and conversely without congression-
al pressure, expansion might be resisted. Therefore:
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C. = c(C ,NA+ ,IAT,LA)t o t-
where
C = initial intercept capacity in year t
NA._ = number of applicants to medical school (lagged to
reflect realization and construction delays)
IAT = inflation and technology advanced
LA = legislative action encouraging increased enroll-
ments in medical schools
The number of drop-outs in any particular year may be
dependent on the particular year, again the net median income
as a proxy of expected earning in the future, the average
annual cost of attendance in medical school, and congression-
al action granting loans, fellowships, grants, etc. Thus:
DO = d (t, NMI, AC , CFA)
where
NMI = net median income
AC, = average annual cost of medical school attendance
in year t
CFA = congressional (fellowship, grants, loans) action
t = particular year
Finally the number of applicants is influenced by net
median income again, as a proxy for expected earnings in the
future, the annual cost as a proxy for the expected outlay
during their schooling, the acceptance rate in previous years
and again congressional action enabling certain students to
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attend whereas they had not previously been able to consider
such action. Therefore:





NMI_ = net median income during a certain vectored
t
period of years
AC = average annual cost









VI. NAVY PHYSICIAN SUPPLY
An interesting subset of the physician supply problem is
the military physician supply and retention problem. Short-
ly after the President's Commission on an All Volunteer
Force reported to the President on February 20, 1970 that an
all volunteer force would better serve the nation's interest,
steps were taken in that direction. By January 1973 the
draft ended for all but physicians and dentists, and in July,
1973 all induction authority ended. This meant that the
Armed Services had to compete in the civilian market for
medical officers for the first time in 33 years. Since only
one-sixth served voluntarily and one-sixth in repayment of
obligations incurred through medical training programs sub-
sidized by the Department of Defense, this left fully two-
thirds serving because of the doctor draft. Compounding the
physician shortage discussed earlier are the pay gaps between
the military medical officer and his civilian counterpart.
Given the considerations above which influence a person to
become a physician, what further induces the physician to
make a career decision in the military? Again there are
monetary and non-monetary decisions, which include potential
earnings, available facilities and equipment, security,
prestige, opportunities for further education and research,
type of patient, patient-physician relationships, etc.
During the past twenty years there have been a variety
of studies identifying factors which affect the retention
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of medical officers. Reviewing thirteen studies from 1956
to 1967, (see Appendix A) Jacox developed a deficiency rating
system and provided a rank order of negative factors from
his review of the literature and compilation of DOD statis-
tics. Beginning with the most critical, they were: (1) in-
stability, (2) salary, (3) career mangement
,
(4) housing,
(5) assignments, (6) professional leadership, (7) family
life, (8) prestige, (9) undesirable location, (10) quality
of medical care, and (11) physician-patient relationship
[49].
Dorman referred to AMA studies which uncovered eight
reasons given by physicians and their wives for not choosing
a permanent military career. In order of importance they
were: insufficient pay, inadequate housing, frequent moves,
separation from family, inadequate or interrupted schooling
for children, lack of recognition and prestige, dislike for
military social life, and undesirable duty locations [50].
A recent study by C. L. Braunstein canvassed Navy physi-
cians and considered a "target group" as those who were ei-
ther undecided about service plans or intended to remain but
not necessarily until retirement. The most popular proposal
was to increase total pay to the income earned by civilian
practitioners with equivalent qualifications. Sixty-one
percent would be "greatly encouraged to stay" and 23.3 per-
cent would be "moderately encouraged to stay." Although the
second most important proposal dealt with staying in one lo-
cation for eight to twelve years, the third proposal enacting
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a pay package that would boost the pay of junior medical
officers reflected the monetary priority of the target group
[51].
A DOD survey of military medical officers contained
twelve possible proposals. The most popular was to "obtain
authorization to pay physicians the amount they could earn
outside military service." As a matter of fact, 36.3 per-
cent of those responding indicated they would stay with that
policy change [52].
With these studies as a background, the Department of
Defense has devised two economic instruments to replace con-
scription as a means of obtaining and retaining physicians:
1. The medical scholarship program of Sept 1972
2. A special bonus for physicians of May 1974 (see
Appendix B)
Under the scholarship program the military pays for tui-
tion, fees, books, and lab expenses for up to four years of
medical education; the medical student also receives about
$5000 per year. In return he agrees to serve one year in
the military for each year he participates in the program,
with a minimum obligation of two years.
E. J. Devine of the Center for Naval Analyses, constructed
a version of the standard economic model of occupational
choice between military and civilian careers to evaluate the
financial attractiveness of military service to a physician.
During the first four years of medical school and the next
four years of internship and residency the Navy income was
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higher than civilian income. During the next four years,
however, the Navy physician is actually repaying the subsidy
and civilian income exceeds Navy income by its greatest
amount. But with the maximum $13,500 bonus, military pay
again would exceed civilian pay during the last five years
of service. Upon retirement from the military, Devine as-
sumed a physician capable of earning the same as his civil-
ian counterpart and drawing military retirement pay in
addition.
Comparing present values, the entrant into medical
school would see a higher present value of Navy pay over
civilian pay — even with no bonus, undiscounted and at rates
of five and ten percent. At the end of obligated service
the same is true except at the ten percent rate.
He concluded (1) the financial advantages of the scholar-
ship program were sufficient to fill all authorized scholar-
ships, (2) the scholarship was generally a good investment
compared with the alternative procurement methods analyzed,
provided no bonus was paid during the years of obligated
service, and (3) it does not pay the military to retain a
scholarship recipient for a 20 year career compared with in-
vesting in a succession of scholarship recipients who serve
the initial obligation only [53]. l
Consequently the scholarship program is evaluated to be
the major source of accessions in the near future.




The bonus is viewed as both an acquisition and retention
device. The bonus simply makes the scholarship program all
the more attractive. In the one case where there was a
higher present value in the civilian career at a ten percent
discount, the Navy with the bonus would be more attractive.
Consequently Devine concludes that (1) although the bonus
will increase retention, the amount of increase is unknown,
(2) the bonus is superior to continuation pay since it per-
mits a restructuring of the income experience profile so it
more closely resembles that in the civilian sector and (3)
the bonus is not large enough to attract unobligated post-
residents into the military.
In addition to the above mentioned enactments, Congress
has approved a uniformed services university of health
sciences recently. To be located near Washington, D.C., the
first students will enter next year. The first 50 medical
students will graduate in 1979, 125 the year after, and no
less than 100 annually thereafter. The students will be
commissioned officers serving on active duty in pay grade
0-1 with full pay and allowances of that grade. Students
who graduate are required, unless exempted, to serve for not
less than seven years. It is intended that the group will
comprise a small, steady position of the physician needs of
the Armed Services, much as the academies provide a nucleus
of the line officer requirements.
Admiral Custis, Surgeon General of the Navy and Chief of
the Bureau of Medicine, sees less problems with the recruitment
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program than with the Navy retention program. He states
that the "scholarship programs are extremely popular and
fully subscribed. The interest in Navy internships is ex-
cellent. Navy residency training programs, always highly
regarded because of their superior quality are well accepted.
Applications for the latter training are often in excess of
need. However, a genuine problem exists when trying to in-
terest the practicing physician in a Navy career" [54]. To
this end he calls for congressional support in the following
areas: (1) equitable pay for health professionals, (2) gen-
erous educational subsidies, and (3) support for the five-
year medical construction program.
The disparity in incomes was also examined by the Health
Personnel All-Volunteer Task Force. Utilizing a present
value concept, they determined that none of the pre-compen-
sation compared with the civilian compensation at any of
four points: beginning of medical school, after completion
of four, ten, and twelve years of active service [55], Con-
sequently they saw large problems in meeting personnel re-
quirements in the Medical Corps without some sort of policy
modification. Based on the results of a physician survey,
they conclude "the change which would result in by far the
largest increase in retention is equivalent income."
Admiral Custis provided the following table of five
year projected requirements, on board strengths, predicted












3340 3052 2752 2362
1790 1030 1000 900
2068
715
997 742 710 510 421
740 789 1011 1401 1395
[56]
These estimates were made assuming that Congressional
support to make Navy medicine economically and professionally
competitive with the private sector and that in-house initia-
tives would not be fruitful. Clearly the trend of short-
falls is catastrophic. In fiscal year 74 the shortfall is
less than 50 percent of the predicted losses, by fiscal year
78, it is nearly 200 percent.
In consonance, then, with earlier chapters which indi-
cate a person selects medicine as a career based on economic
reasons such as expected net median income, a physician
tends to leave the Navy when he cannot realize this expecta-
tion. The reason most frequently offered is that of equit-
able pay with the caveat that he could be persuaded to stay
with an increase in compensation making his salary comparable
to that of a civilian physician with similar qualifications.
Given then the present constraints of the Navy budget,
it seems prudent to invest the Navy's money in scholarships
helping the medical student to fund his education. Indica-
tions are that despite the immediate outlay, this method is
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most attractive to students and will result in a greater
supply to meet the quoted demand, and at least possibly in-




In the first section of the thesis, the relevant liter-
ature was reviewed and a theoretical foundation was provided
for a physician supply function. Subsequently a set of
structural equations was proposed to explain factors affect-
ing the supply of physicians. These equations were intended
as a framework for econometric analysis of physician supply
functions. Throughout the specification care was exercised
to include only those variables in the structural equations
that were quantifiable and for which sufficient data for
estimation exists. With these terms, both monetary and
otherwise, policies can be examined and their effects assessed,
These equations then lay the framework for further research




Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert L. Jacox used the following
thirteen studies in his review of factors affecting the re-
tention of Medical Officers:
1. Report of the Committee on Army Medical Education to
the Surgeon General, United States Army
,
National Academy of
Sciences, Washington, D.C., January 1956.
2. Factors Affecting the Career Intentions of U.S. Army
Medical Officers
,
NORC , University of Chicago, June 1958.
3. Career Orientations of U.S. Army Medical Interns in
Fiscal Year 1956 by Norman A. Hilmer, Captain MSC, OTSGDA,
January 1958.
4. Report of an Opinion and Intention Survey of Physicians
and Dentists on Active Duty
,
Department of the Air Force,
1962.
5. Review of Professional Medical Personnel Procurement,
and Training
,
Parts I & II, TSGDA, November 1965.
6. Navy Medical Care and Doctor Retention Problems
,
Office
of the Surgeon General, U.S. Navy, November 1965.




8. Physicians in the Armed Services
,
Logistics Management
Institute, Washington, D.C., March 1967.




(draft of an unpublished study, 18 July 1966).
10. Problems in Retention of U.S. Army Medical Corps Offi-
cers by Floyd W. Baker, LCOL, U.S. Army, ICAF, Washington,
D.C., 1967.
11. Why Doctors Get Out
,
William A. Boysen, COL, MC, U.S.,
Army, War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 7 April
1967.
12. Factors Influencing the Retention of Physicians in the
Department of Defense
,
William D. Tribble, 1967.
13. Doctor Draft Justified? A Management Diagnosis
,
William














4-13 $12,000 $12,500 $13,000 $13,500
14-19 11,500 12,000 12,500 13,000
20-25 11,000 11,300 11,600 12,000
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